Chapter 1: The Student's Insight

Not long ago, while reviewing student essays on Aristotle’s virtue ethics, a comment from one of my students caught my attention. I shared this thought on Facebook, leading to a meaningful dialogue that I felt compelled to document for further contemplation. The student remarked, “virtue operates in such a way that it makes non-virtuous individuals aware of their own vices.” This statement, along with the ensuing conversation, merits deeper exploration.

Awareness of One's Own Vices

In the context of Aristotle’s moral framework, it’s understandable that my student may have misrepresented certain aspects. Aristotle recognizes various moral states beyond merely virtuous and vicious. Unless one subscribes to a moral theory that negates the existence of intermediates, it is erroneous to assume that a lack of virtue equates to a possession of vice.

Thus, non-virtuous individuals aren't necessarily vicious. Aristotle identifies several categories, including:

• The self-controlled (enkratic): These individuals understand what is right and strive to act accordingly, even if they don’t fully embrace these actions as virtuous.
• The uncontrolled (akratic): These persons also recognize the good but fail to act on it, often succumbing to less desirable choices.

While non-virtuous individuals can include the vicious, they are not synonymous. A non-virtuous person may not have developed vices that define their character. However, if we differentiate between vicious dispositions (actual vices) and vicious tendencies, we find a more nuanced understanding.

Vicious dispositions, termed "vices" in Aristotle's lexicon, represent ingrained habits that consistently lead to negative choices and behaviors. Vicious tendencies, on the other hand, are merely inclinations towards such desires and evaluations. If these tendencies persist, they may solidify into more permanent dispositions. But this path is not inevitable, and perhaps this is the crux of my student's insight.

For Aristotle, even those who aren’t fully vicious possess the ability to recognize their desires and actions. This awareness allows them to discern how their behavior may resemble that of a vicious person. In contrast, a truly vicious individual suffers from a moral blindness, confusing good and bad.

How Does Virtue Illuminate Badness?

My Facebook interlocutor approached the topic through a lens more akin to textbook interpretations of Aristotle’s virtue ethics than the texts themselves, such as the Nicomachean Ethics. This isn’t a critique; rather, it highlights that while their thoughts are valid, they don't encompass the entire picture.

It's essential to view virtue as a dynamic process rather than a static state. Virtue exists on a continuum, and individuals can become more or less virtuous over time. As one develops virtue, it can strengthen or weaken their motivations and choices. A fledgling virtue might possess vulnerabilities that will be fortified through consistent practice.

This raises a question: How do virtuous individuals come to be? The answer lies in the fact that people are not born virtuous. They emerge from a state of being neither virtuous nor vicious. By practicing virtue—similar to mastering musical scales—individuals can improve their moral discernment and action.

Intellectually, there are many facets to virtue. Understanding what is right in specific situations is one aspect, while becoming increasingly aware of one’s limitations and potential moral failings is another.

When my interlocutor posed a question about the role of repetition in developing virtue, they touched on something significant: Does practice shift one’s nature towards virtuous action, or does it enhance awareness, enabling better choices? I believe both outcomes are interconnected. Enhanced awareness can support the cultivation of a “second nature” formed through habituation.